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AbstrAct
The book known as the Wisdom of Solomon seems to have been held in high enough 
regard for it to come to the aid of many in the Early Church, at least from the time of 
Origen until that of Theodoret. A consideration of how the book was used in Augustine, 
drawing principally on the work of A.-M. La Bonnadière is then followed by an inves-
tigation of how theologians other than Augustine understood and used one particular 
verse: Wisdom 13:5. The diversity of translation and interpretation encourages one to 
think that this text was viewed as one that had to be taken seriously in giving an account 
of ‘religious epistemology’ from a Christian viewpoint. It was a powerful text, and is 
suggestive of a wider conclusion that the Book as a whole in many of its parts was held 
to have an authoritative message.
1. Wisdom and its status in the early church
Among biblical scholars the Wisdom of Solomon is usually regarded as a prime 
example of the fusion of Judaism and Hellenism, or even as a final stepping-
stone on the way to the New Testament, as in the famous study of Martin 
Hengel.1 Studies of the reception of Wisdom have usually begun with how Jews 
of the early common era interpreted it. Hence William Horbury, playing down 
1 Otto Kaiser states: ‘Auch inhaltlich ist die Sapientia Salomonis wie keine andere biblische 
Schrift durch die griechisch-hellenistische Philosophie beeinflußt. Das gilt für die zentrale Gestalt 
der personifizierten Weisheit, die als Mittlerin zwischen Gott, Welt und Mensch waltet (7,21-8,1), 
gleichgültig ob man sie als Hypostase bezeichnet oder nicht.’ (‘Die Bedeutung der griechischen 
Welt für die alttestamentliche Theologie’, in Zwischen Athen und Jerusalem: Studien zur 
griechischen und biblischen Theologie, ihrer Eigenart und ihrem Verhältnis [Berlin, 2003], 1-38, 
30.) If a world is to be ordered and intervened in, then one can expect a judgement. The premature 
death is no longer a tragedy but a sign of favour (Wis. 4:10). From the idea of being created in 
the image of the immortal God comes the idea of human immortality: this is a preparation for the 
NT where the life in God is brought even closer into our present. In a more recent work Kaiser 
speaks of Wisdom’s relational anthropology, ‘in der Sapientia nicht die Konstitution des Menschen 
sondern seine Verhaltensweisen als Ausdruck ihrer positiven oder negativen Beziehungen zu Gott 
[sieht]’ (Otto Kaiser, Gott, Mensch, Geschichte: Studien zum Verständnis des Menschen und 
seiner Geschichte in der klassischen, biblischen und nachbiblischen Literatur [Berlin and New 
York, 2010], 349.) See also his Vom offenbaren und verborgenen Gott: Studien zur spätbiblischen 
Weisheit und Hermeneutik (Berlin, 2008). 
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the hypothesis that its being positioned after the New Testament books in the 
Muratorian Fragment implied it was to be considered ‘Christian’, describes its 
true function as a counterweight to Ecclesiastes within Judaism, turning Solo-
mon into a true Pharisee on the matter of ‘resurrection’, with the work an 
inspired prophecy just as the Song of Songs.2 Yet by the time of the Fragment 
(say c. 300) the book had found its place at the end of the NT list, described 
as ‘sapientia ab amicis salomonis in honore ipsius’– ‘Wisdom written by Philo 
in honour of Solomon’. However in the more ‘mainstream’ Codices Alexandrinus 
and Sinaiticus Wisdom is back among the OT books. Perhaps one should not 
make too much of its short-lived association with the NT for the question of 
its formation, although it is significant for the question of Wisdom’s reception.
It is interesting that D. Winston in his Anchor Bible Commentary on The 
Wisdom of Solomon is not at all interested in Wisdom’s being the Church’s 
book, and far less will he explore the issues of its canonicity. Instead he 
wants to locate it ‘culturally’ between Philo (Hellenistic Judaism) and Albinus 
(Philosophy), with it containing, e.g. a full-blown doctrine of the soul’s pre-
existence. Likewise S. Lilla notes the many correspondences between Neopla-
tonism and the thought of the Wisdom of Solomon.3 It seems to him quite clear 
that Logos-pneuma as ordering principle of the sensible cosmos was a feature 
of Middle and Neo-platonism, rather than of Stoicism as such.4 However just 
as his learned article itself concludes, is it all that useful to spend much time 
on an analysis of Wisdom along the lines of what it owed to philosophical 
schools? A little more worthwhile is to ask the question of whether the book 
made a contribution to the history of philosophy thereafter. Wisdom 8:1 speaks 
of an extension of Wisdom from centre to extremes, which can also be found 
in subsequent philosophers such as Alcinous (Did. XIV 170), and with Proclus 
(passim) one finds the principle that the higher seeks to help the lower, which 
seems a very similar notion. As for the idea of Wisdom as governing all things 
(Wis. 1:7 and 14:3), Plotinus’ 2nd and 3rd Enneads are dedicated to this topic.5 
2 William Horbury,’Wisdom of Solomon in the Muratorian Fragment’, JTS 45 (1994), 149-59. 
3 Salvatore Lilla, ‘La Sapienza di Salomone tra Stoicismo e Neoplatonismo’, in Letture cris-
tiane dei Libri Sapienziali: 20. Incontro di studiosi della antichità cristiana: 9-11 maggio 1991, 
Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 37 (Roma, 1992), 505-22. 
4 Now in Wisdom there is more Platonism than Stoicism, e.g. Cratylus 412-3 compared with 
Wis. 7:22-4. Parmenides V 1,8 too had mia kai polloi of course. Then there was a bringing 
together of Stoic and Platonic due to Posidonius and Antiochus of Ascalon. In Iamblichus and 
Proclus this would become division and multiplication. The Holy Spirit is multiplex – as are the 
logoi spermatikoi of Stoics and the anima mundi of Plotinus. 
5 ‘In Proclo gli esseri o divinità superiori “tengono insieme” gl’ inferiori e provvedono ad essi’ 
(S. Lilla, ‘La Sapienza’ [1992], 51324). Anyway a first and second stage of Logos seems indicated, 
with the idea of transmission of power from one level to the next, not of creation of a second 
hypostasis. He links this with the Plotinian notion of God as dynamis-power in Enn. V 5,5; V 4,1 
(see. Wis. 7:25). Yet in the same article Lilla mentions that Plotinus also viewed Wisdom as 
‘hypostasis’. 
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One might well compare Wisdom 9:1 with Plotinus Ennead V 5, 1 (339) and 
Ps-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus VII, 2. From Wisdom 7:27 comes the idea 
of the One, stable and immutable, giving off its energy,6 with which one might 
compare Ps-Dionysius De div. nom. XI 2 and Proclus, Elements of Theology 
112,4-5. Or again, Wisdom 6:16, that those who receive Wisdom receive 
according to their desert of her (toùv âzíouv aût±v) is not unlike Proclus, 
Elements of Theology7 and a whole stream of Neoplatonists through to Ps-
Dionysius and even John Scotus Eriugena.
So is Lilla claiming that Wisdom actually influenced Neoplatonic philoso-
phers who read it? Is it at least the case (as Theiler put it) that Wisdom was 
some sort of a Vorbereitung for Neoplatonism?8 Possibly: or there is more 
probably a common source in the Academy of Speusippus and Posidonius, 
from which Wisdom also borrowed? There is at least one other possibility, 
pleads Lilla: the Ammonius who influenced Plotinus was an Alexandrian 
Christian who knew the Wisdom Literature.9 However this thesis relies on the 
confusion between the Ammonius mentioned by Eusebius and the Platonist 
Ammonius Saccas who taught in the 230s.10
We might be on surer ground when trying to assess how the Church inter-
preted the book in her theology. A. Tuilier helpfully sketches the story of the 
fate of Wisdom in the early church theologians.11 Mentioned only in passing by 
Irenaeus and all but ignored by Clement, the book was much appreciated by 
(Ps.-)Hippolytus (early 3rd c.), who wrote of Hermas and Wisdom as being 
among those books which should be read for edification, and that they were 
probably both composed by Philo, (Ps-)Hippolytus thought, in honour of Solo-
mon, hence ‘le prolongement de la tradition sapientiale authentique.’12 Also, 
Wisdom 2:12-6 and 5:1-9 were regarded in the Hippolytan Adversus Judeos as 
prophetic oracles. C. Larcher in his 1969 work notes that even the ‘canonically 
strict’ Melito in his Peri Pascha was inspired by Wisdom, especially the salva-
tion-historical part of Chapters 12-8. Origen was happy to use it in key places 
6 ‘L’uno resta cioè sempre immutabile in se stesso nonostante la processione della sua energia’ 
(ibid.). 
7 E.R. Dodds, Proclus: The elements of theology; a revised text with translation, introduction 
and commentary (Oxford, 1933), 273-74. 
8 Willy Theiler, Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (Diss 1928; Berlin 1934; Berlin 
and Zürich, 1964), on the religiosity of Poseidonios, writes: ‘Der immanente Umschwung 
erleichtert dem orientalischen Glauben, Formulierungen griechischen Denkens zu übernehmen, 
ist andererseits die Vorbedingung für den schließlichen äußeren Sieg des Christentums’ (ibid. 
153).  
9 S. Lilla, ‘La Sapienza’ (1992), 522. See Eusebius, Hist. eccl. VI 19,7: AmmÉniov mèn gàr 
Xristianòv ên Xristiano⁄v ânatraƒeìv goneÕsin. 
10 See R. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church (New York, 2011), 6. 
11 A. Tuilier, ‘Les livres sapientiaux et le canon de l’Ancien Testament’, in Letture cristiane 
dei libri Sapienziali, (Roma, 1992), 19-34. 





in De principiis, especially where its speculative flavour seemed to aid his 
own flights of fancy. Now at IV, 6 of that work he admits its canonicity was 
contested, yet he still wants to use Wisdom 11:17 to argue that hyle never 
means ‘matter’ in Scripture. He repeats this discussion in his Commentary on 
John XXVIII (when discussing Wisdom 1:5). Larcher argues that Wisdom 
declined in influence in Origen’s Caesarean period when he was under the 
influence of Jewish interpretations, yet it was back in force by the end of his 
life in Alexandria, when he became more interested in Christian apologetic, 
although this change of view possibly started to occur during his time in Cae-
sarea. Certainly in his final period he was more than ready to use Wisdom in 
battle with Celsus. R. Heine is of the opinion that Origen never thought that 
Wisdom was written by Solomon, but was inspired nonetheless.13
Even when ‘22’ became a magic number for the books of the OT canon and 
Wisdom was excluded by the likes of Eusebius, nevertheless Athanasius saw 
Wisdom as ‘authentic’ and as ‘containing’ God’s mind. Therefore the book was 
considered êndiáqetov, hence êndiáqjkov (belonging to the testament). 
In Epiphanius’s view Sirach and Wisdom were clearly deemed to lack that 
inspiration, but had the character of philosophical dialogue (proforikóv).14 
And despite the fact that Ambrose composed homilies on the book, the Coun-
cil of Carthage’s (394) determination to keep the larger canon, and Augustine 
and Gelasius’ support for this, Jerome’s canonical minimalism held sway until 
the Council of Trent in the West (1545) – at least in theory, for the Western 
Church quietly continued to use Wisdom; whereas in the East it was officially 
reintroduced in 692. Antiochenes no less than Cappadocians had been happy 
to appeal to Wisdom. Rufinus borrowed from Athanasius the idea of ‘ecclesi-
astical books’ as a way of categorising books like Wisdom, and Gregory the 
Great reintroduced the distinction between books that were canonical and those 
that were ad aedificationem ecclesiae. Officially, one was to keep it for cate-
chumens only, or for edification, which suggests that Wisdom was never seen 
as dangerous, but perhaps just not as spiritual as the fully canonical books. 
Notwithstanding this it carried doctrinal clout. As Larcher puts it, it found its 
role in furnishing the church through the ages with timeless truths.15 If it could 
be read out in church then Rabanus Maurus saw no reason not to comment on it. 
He saw the Cross as the passion of the Wisdom of God foretold in Wisdom 2 
(PL 109, 671), no doubt with some debt to Paul in 1Corinthians 2. Wisdom 
came to have ‘ecclesiastical’ authority, yet usually more by means of selected 
13 R. Heine, Origen (2011), 73. My thanks to Steve Bagby for drawing my attention to Heine’s 
argument. 
14 A. Tuilier, ‘Les livres sapientiaux’ (1992), 28: ‘qui s’applique au discours proféré dans la 
réflexion philosophique des anciens.’ 
15 C. Larcher, Etudes sur le livre de la Sagesse (Paris, 1969), 62: ‘Il est allegué presque tou-
jours pour sa portée doctrinale et ce sont les mêmes textes dogmatiques qui sont cites par les Pères 
de toutes les époques, à travers la diversité des églises.’ 
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texts, than as a whole book.16 In writing a complete commentary Rabanus 
Maurus marked a turn from the guarded patristic attitude to a more unreserv-
edly welcoming medieval one.
2. Wisdom and its effect on Augustine’s theology
For all that Larcher and Tuilier have contributed to our understanding, it is 
mostly the matter of the canonical status of Wisdom that has occupied them. 
A lot has been made about the sources of Wisdom, and not so much of its recep-
tion: how it served doctrine and had an impact that way. Instead, one might 
want to look at the impact of Wisdom on the early Church, and argue that a text 
has authority when it stimulates or founds a theologoumenon that would not 
have been just what it was but for that text. A.-M. La Bonnadière managed to 
turn to this question in the second part of her book on Wisdom in Augustine, 
and to an extent the North African tradition (largely Cyprian). Her overall 
thesis is that Wisdom supplied theological-philosophical riches which comple-
mented and counterbalanced the late ‘Augustinian predestinarianism’, although 
on inspection to play these ‘Augustines’ off against each other means going 
against the grain of the evidence. It is true to say that the saint was interested 
in the early parts of the book, and was only really interested in a few verses 
from Chapter 11 onwards: 11:18b; 11:21; 11:25; 12:18 (against Julian); and 
16 C. Larcher in his commentary (Le livre de la sagesse, ou, la sagesse de Salomon [Paris, 
1983-1985]) assembles a gallery of commentators, which it might be useful just to summarize 
here. Wisdom featured well in the East, especially with Methodius and Chrysostom, Anastasius 
the Sinaite and then even more so in the Sacra Parallela attributed to John of Damascus. Also to 
be mentioned are Ps-Maximus, Loci communes; Antiochus of San Sabas’ Pandektes. Ceriani’s 
Syro-hexapla has a number of marginal explicatory notes which are like glosses. Then there was 
Matthew Cantacuzen (c. 1380) and the monk Malachi, the latter (Bib. Vatic. gr. 1233) much more 
readable than the former. In the West, Taion of Saragossa’s comments are available in PL Supp IV 
2, 1772-80. Apart from Rabanus Maurus’ first extant commentary, written at Fulda, there was 
the Glossa Ordinaria, Peter the Chanter, Stephen Langton (2 vols.), Hugh of St Cher; Guerric of 
St Quentin (d. 1245), possibly Bonaventura, Eckhart, and Nicolas of Lyra. ‘Mais le grand nom 
est celui de Robert Holkot, dominicain d’Oxford (†1349), qui inaugure, par certain traits, le genre 
des commentaires modernes’ (a 1481 printing was reprinted up to 1689 at Cologne.) In the ‘mod-
ern’ period there are commentaries by Pierre Naninck of Louvain; Cornelius Jansen of Ghent; 
the Jesuits Lorinus and Lapide, with many reprints, but also Maldonatus, Calmet, Bossuet (in his 
‘Livres de Salomon’) and C.F. Houbigant. However there were also Protestant commentators: 
Conrad Pellikan, Grotius in his Annotationes, and J.G. Hasse in 1785 (Jena). Stand-out contribu-
tions were those by Marc de Berulle, L’explication selon le sens litteral des 5 livres de la Sagesse 
(Grenoble, 1680), and by B. Arias Montanus Libri, ‘Sapientia’ in Sacrorum Bibliorum t. III 
(Anvers, 1623), 1-33. The work of F. Feldmann, Textkritische Materialen zum Buch der Wesiheit 
gesammelt aus der sahidischen, syrohexaplarischen und armenischen Übersetzung (Freiburg im 
Breisgau, 1902) provides a valuable resource. 
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13:5, which has echoes in Rom. 1:18-25. Augustine was not at all interested in 
Wisdom’s account of the history of Israel.17
Of course the fact that verses from Wisdom often appear within florilegia or 
testimonia of biblical texts might indicate that Wisdom was rarely allowed to 
operate on its own, but its part was of an auxiliary or garnishing nature. La Bon-
nadière tells us that Augustine made up his own testimonia after the manner of 
Cyprian and did not just use Cyprian’s. These appear mostly in polemical 
 contexts. On inspection, the text from Wisdom is often ancillary or decorative, 
but not always. For example, at Enarratio in Psalmos 9, s. I,I: ‘Duo etiam 
iudicia insinuantur per Scripturas, si quis advertat, unum occultum, alterum 
manifestum.’ He finds a mention of the hidden one in 1Peter 4:17a and the 
manifest one in John 5:24. But in order to find a mention of a double judge-
ment in the same passage, he has to turn to Wisdom 12. Augustine comments: 
‘We read about these two judgements in scripture, where it is written: because 
of this you have given mocking judgement as if to those who were senseless 
children. Those who have not been corrected by this judgement have no share 
in the fitting judgement of God’. Those who are not being corrected by the 
hidden judgement of God will most rightly be punished by that open judgement 
of God. This is the only place in Latin patristic literature where this verse is 
quoted.18
As La Bonnadiére observed, the OT was used much more in Augustine’s 
polemics just as the example here. But did Wisdom belong to the OT? Augus-
tine would certainly repeat certain select verses from Wisdom the better to 
engrain them on the minds of catechisand and catechised. As he established in 
civ. XVII 20: ‘However, the writings not included in the Jewish canon do not 
carry as much weight as the canonical books when put forward as evidence 
against the opposition’.19 This means in a polemical, not a pastoral context. Yet 
the pastoral could quickly become the polemical and vice versa, when the situ-
ation demanded. Thus, as La Bonnadière notes, Wisdom was used against the 
Manicheans and the Pelagians to safeguard divine transcendence in creation 
and salvation. In all these, texts from Wisdom are not merely illustrative. In 
polemical battle with heretics they were the jumping-off points. They inspired 
Augustine to think more loftily of God than his enemies did.20 Wisdom 9:15 
17 A.-M. La Bonnadière, Biblia Augustiniana: AT: Le Livre de la Sagesse (Paris: Études Augus-
tiniennes, 1970). 
18 ‘Haec duo iudicia etiam in Sapientia legimus, ubi scriptum est: Propter hoc tamquam pueris 
insensatis iudicium inderisum dedisti: hi autem hoc iudicio non correcti, dignum Dei iudicium 
experti sunt (Wis.12:25-6). Qui ergo non corriguntur isto occulto Dei iudicio, dignissime illo 
manifesto punientur’ (A.-M. La Bonnadiére, Le Livre de la Sagesse [1970], 123). 
19 ‘Sed adversus contradictores non tanta firmitate proferuntur, quae scripta non sunt in 
canone Iudaeorum.’ 
20 ‘Les polémiques ont pour point de depart un texte de l’Écriture ou prennent appui immédia-
tement sur elle. Les passages de la Sagesse évoqués, pour ne parler ici que de ce livre, ne sont 
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(‘for a perishable body weighs down the soul’) is the verse most used, to prove 
that evil is caused by us, not by cosmic powers. Nevertheless she thinks the 
most creative contribution by Wisdom to Augustine’s theology was that made 
by Wisdom 7:27, that Wisdom herself in animas sanctas se transfert, which is 
a very strong assertion of the all-sufficiency of grace for Christians. Wisdom is 
rarely quoted in chunks – the best example is De trin. III 10 (21) where human 
frailty is associated with human ignorance: this passage does not seem to be 
about sin, but rather about human limitation, although elsewhere (En. Ps. 127.16 
and Ad Simplicianum I, qu. 1,13) Wisdom 9:15 is used to show how corrup- 
tion is the state of fallen humankind: ‘Corpus enim quod corrumpitur aggravat 
animam. Per quod fit etiam saepe, ut invicte delectet quod non licet. Quam 
sarcinam prementem et urgentem ideo legem appellat, quia iure supplicii 
divino iudicio tributa et imposita est ab eo qui praemonuit hominem dicens: 
Qua die manducaveritis morte moriemini.’
So the fact of the matter is that for issues of doctrine and practice Wisdom 
did carry authority for Augustine in the sense that the book shaped these two. 
The LXX after all was the work of prophets (civ. XV 14), so that Wisdom had 
a prima facie case to be considered as having authority. No-one would have 
gone to the bother of making a Latin translation of some uninspired document, 
which was an argument that would be re-employed in the Middle Ages for the 
canonicity of 2Esdras. La Bonnadière21 claimed that in Augustine’s hands, 
Wisdom of Solomon inspired a cosmic vision that encouraged piety, outlined 
a moral theology and implied a Trinity of Love. She is enamoured of the 
idea proposed by Larcher that Wisdom, which would later be personified in 
Christ as an incarnation of an influence, is ‘already’ in our text a hypostasis.22 
Now quite how a hypostasization can be called ‘a kind of incarnation’ when 
its incarnation is yet to come shows us again the bewildering width of seman-
tic range given to the term ‘hypostasis’. What can be said is that in keeping 
with Augustine’s view of things Christ is predicted in Wisdom and the Church 
is foretold in Sirach. The former was in keeping with the North African tradi-
tion of exegesis but went a step further than it, by combining Wisdom 2 with 
Isaiah 53.23
pas des illustrations d’arguments théologiques, mais bien leur fondements’ (A.-M. La Bonnadière, 
Le Livre de la Sagesse [1970], 108). 
21 A.-M. La Bonnadiére, Le Livre de la Sagesse (1970), 386. 
22 ‘Le lien entre la Sagesse qui est en Dieu et la Sagesse communiqué à l’homme et possédée 
par lui, c’est précisement son influence authentiquement divine qui, par certains de ses aspects, 
annonce déjà la réalité chrétienne de la grâce. Or la Sagesse personifiée est aussi, nous semble-t-il, 
une sorte d’incarnation de cette influence’ (A.-M. La Bonnadière, Le Livre de la Sagesse [1970], 
388). 
23 A.-M. La Bonnadiére, Le Livre de la Sagesse (1970), 190. 
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3. Wisdom 13:5 in Augustine
Let us take only one small but important verse and see how it operated. Wis- 
dom 13: 5 reads: êk gàr megéqouv kallon±v ktismátwn ânalógwv ö gene­
siourgòv aût¬n qewre⁄tai. From the greatness and beauty of created things 
the Creator of these can be seen analogically. Larcher in his commentary on 
Sagesse sees Wisdom 13:5 as religious, not drily philosophical, and insists this 
verse is ‘préoccupé, non par l’existence de Dieu, mais par sa connaissance.’ 
Xenophon had said one gets to know the gods from their works (Mem. IV, III, 
13-4). Beauty, majesty and power are like a ‘trampoline’ (Larcher), helping to 
lift oneself towards an intuitive contemplation.24 Yet qewre⁄tai is an activity 
of the mind which judges one thing after another, or draws a conclusion from 
observation. The modern exegete-theologian Gilbert comments on that: when 
the verb qewre⁄tai is combined with ânalógwv it means contemplation on its 
sober first step, rather than an activity at the endpoint of mystical contempla-
tion. For there is also a way of affirmation – only possible if the human mind 
starts out from the cosmos analogy: the Jewish mind could perceive God as 
‘une présence agissante’, leaving traces as He goes.25 The experience then is 
not one of pure negation as in Philo but a ‘being seized’ in a religious way, as 
one works towards the contemplation that feels like something penetrating and 
warm. So too the term ho genesiourgos autôn is found for the first time in 
Wisdom: ‘L’auteur du devenir ou de l’existence’ – he is the One with which 
one ends when one contemplates the universe religiously. 
For Augustine the human mind is the means of knowing God: Yet Augustine 
has God cognoscibiliter in his citation, where the Greek has analagôs.26 God 
can be known even though God is not measurable or proportionate to anything 
in creation. He cannot be an object of knowledge. What seems to result is quite 
another understanding, which his saturation in the Book encourages: ‘I quote 
this passage from the book of Wisdom in case any of the faithful should reckon 
24 C. Larcher, Le livre de la sagesse (1983-85), ad loc: ‘La beauté, la majesté grandiose, la 
puissance qui éclatent dans la nature sont pour l’esprit un tremplin naturel pour s’élever jusqu’à 
l’excellence et à la puissance divines. Connues d’une façon proportionnelle ou analogique, et pour 
rejoindre, dans une sorte de regard contemplatif ou intuitif’. 
25 See M. Gilbert, La Critique des Dieux dans le livre de la Sagesse (Sg 13-15), Analecta 
Biblica 53 (Rome, 1973), 26: it is also there in De mundo 399b, 19-22 (See further A.J. Festu-
gière, La Révélation d’Hermes Trismégiste. II. Le Dieu cosmique [Paris, 1949], 473). There are 
only two pre-Christian occurrences of analogôs, one where Philo uses the term to explain what 
Moses was getting at by outlawing mixing animals together Spec. leg. III 48. But of course the 
substantive analogia exists in Plato: it is the means by which the soul reckons from past and 
present into the future. Aristotle didn’t use but knew of the idea, as fragments in his Peri phi-
losophias frg. 12a suggest. The Stoics did not think that analogy provided a way to know God, 
but that it was useful for trying to know things beyond experience. 
26 S. George, ‘Der Begriff analogos im Buch der Weisheit’, in Kurt Flasch (ed.), PAROUSIA. 
FS Johann Hirschberger (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1965), 189-97.  
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I have been wasting time for nothing in first searching creation for signs of that 
supreme trinity we are looking for when we are looking for God, going step by 
step through various trinities of different sorts until we eventually arrive at the 
mind of man’ (De trin. XV 3).27 It does seem that for Augustine, the mind of 
man is as far as we get when we try to know the Trinitarian God. This is the 
all-important idea of Wisdom 13:5 picked up by Paul in Rom. 1:20. A few lines 
later, Augustine recalls that the image of God is ‘man according to the mind 
renewed in the knowledge of God who created man for (ad) His image, so that 
the Trinity might appear in it’.28 The book of Wisdom seems to help. In fact 
declares Augustine,29 the whole point is to gaze (conspicere) on the invisible 
intellectual things of God by means of reflection on creation. The message is 
that God cannot be gazed on directly: ‘Sed quia lux illa ineffabilis nostrum 
reverberabat obtutum et ei nondum posse contemperari nostrae mentis quodam 
modo convincebatur infirmitas… ad summam trinitatem quae deus est conspic-
iendam nos erigere volumus nec valemus.’ This describes a process in the 
Christian life, where love stirs up a desire to know directly, yet where one 
has to settle for mediated knowledge where the desire is diverted into love. 
De trinitate IV 20 with its idea of experimental knowledge was picked up, 
La Bonnadière reminds us, by Thomas.30 Virtues are set in motion by infused 
divine love. This is not theoretical knowledge but a personal-mystical one, and 
a practical one.
4. Wisdom 13:5 in fathers other than Augustine
However it is only if there are more writers than just Augustine interested in it 
that we might be able to speak of Wisdom as exercising authority in the Church. 
In other words what La Bonnadière did for Augustine needs to be done for other 
fathers. Now among the versions for ânalógwv the Syriac has ‘manifestly’,31 
27 De trin. XV, III, 45-50; CChr.SL LA, 462: ‘Haec de libro sapientiae propterea posui ne 
me fidelium quispiam frustra et inaniter existimet in creatura prius per quasdam sui generis trini-
tates quosdam modo gradatim donec ad mentem hominis pervenirem quaesisse indicia summae 
illius trinitatis quam quaerimus cum deum quaerimus.’  
28 De trin. XV, III, 108-11; CChr.SL LA, 467: ‘Universa ipsa rerum natura proclamat habere 
se praestantissimum conditorem qui nobis mentem rationemque naturalem dedit qua viventia non 
viventibus…’ 
29 De trin. XV, VI, 48-54; CChr.SL LA, 472-3. 
30 Thomas, In Sent. Ia q. 43, art. 5, 2 and id., STh. I 43,5: ‘Filius invisibiliter…’ 
31 ‘Le Peshitta a traduit par galio’ith, ce qui peut se rendre en latin par manifeste’ (M. Gilbert, 
La Critique [1973], 29). D. Winston in his Anchor Bible Commentary (New York, 1979), 252-6 
comments how the Stoics knew things by analogy, although it was not they but the Platonists like 
Albinus who thought one could know God by analogy, as Philo had it: as the soul is to the world, 
so is God to the universe (Abr. 71ff.). For the author of the universe to be perceived this way 
means His existence is acknowledged, little more. Something of the heart in the right place is 
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the Armenian has ‘by mode of relation’ whereas the Latin cognoscibiliter was 
later rendered consequenter32 or even intelligibiliter.33 As for the Church 
fathers, ‘les Latins ont traduit de diverses façons: cognoscibiliter (Vulgate et 
Augustin), intelligibiliter (Grégoire le Grand), consequenter (Hilaire et Jérôme), 
mais jamais analogice.’ Gilbert also mentions Bonaventure’s rather obvious-
sounding statement34 which is first, that contemplation is operated with the 
inner sense, but also that the capacity for contemplation is said to be propor-
tional to each, which obviously has echoes of Rom. 12. In any case, Gilbert 
insists that this helps us to see that the biblical message is not about each 
individual not being able to reach contemplation of God (as Vasquez had inter-
preted Wisdom 9:15), but the human race as a whole, or the average human, as 
it were, and clearly at 9:15 it is not ‘humans at their best’ who are meant. 
However Vatican I would not follow Vasquez, in which Gilbert rejoices. 
Pius XII in Humani generis (DS 3875) then confirmed that humans could know 
the existence of God and divine things. Hans Hübner in his commentary asserts 
that this verse is witness to the ‘ontische Seite der Analogie’ – what he describes 
as an analogy of knowing persons, when God and each address the other. This 
might be called an analogia cognoscendi, which is quite removed from any 
analogy of being in which God gets located and assigned a place.35
This article approaches its end by offering some soundings from the tradition 
of ‘patristic’ exegesis. Origen,36 in discussing Jesus’ healing miracles, notes 
that catechumens come with all sorts of diseases. The blind come to see and 
know Him from the great and beautiful things of creation analogically, when 
they see his invisible things from the creation of the cosmos, that is, distinctly 
and clearly. One should note that there is no mention of Wisdom 13:5 in 
Origen’s Romans commentary on Rom. 1:20. This could be because it was a 
product of his Caesarean period when he seems to have held more strictly to a 
Jewish canon. Yet here in the Matthew commentary he is inspired by Wis. 13:5 
to observe the hidden things in creation, which powerfully effect a distinct and 
clear knowledge of God. People can and should look to creation for ‘healing’.
echoed both in Philo (Praem. 43) and Augustine (civ. 4.31) – Varro came close to the truth, but 
erred on the mutability of the soul, denying the need for the Immutable God as the soul’s creator. 
32 So, Biblia Sahidica and Hilary, De trin. I 7 (PL 10, 30). 
33 Gregory the Great, Moralia XVI 12 (PL 76, 358). 
34 M. Gilbert, La critique (1973), 29141: ‘BONAVENTURE explique cognoscibiliter: “non 
sensibiliter, id est oculo intellectuali, non sensibili.”’ 
35 H. Hübner, Die Weisheit Salomons (ATD Apokryphen Bd. 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 1999), 168f: ‘Es ist deshalb theologisch zu reflektieren (hier kann es nur angedeutet 
werden), inwiefern aus der Analogie der Begegnungsfähigkeit von Gott und Mensch die Argu-
mentation in Sap 13 in ein anderes ontologisches Koordinatensystem transferiert werden müßte 
und daraus, der antiken und mittelalterlichen Ontologie entnommen, ein neues, nämlich höheres 
Übersetzungspotential freigesetzt werden könnte. Daß [sic] bedeutet nicht die völlige Aufgabe 
jener alten Ontologie, sondern nur, sie in eine neue Reflexionsdimension “aufzuheben”.’ 
36 Comm. Matth. 11, Ch 18 (SC 162, 376). 
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Eusebius in his Commentary on Isaiah 40:12-14 comments: ‘From the 
greatness and beauty of created things the Creator of these can be seen ana-
logically, namely, He makes those things which are too great for us small 
through a higher arrangement, summoning us towards the idea (∂nnoian) of 
the one who sustains all thingsˆ.37 Again, in his commentary on Isaiah 44:7, 
Eusebius links this thought in its Septuagintal form (which is distinctive over 
against the Masoretic text in its last five words – ‘from which he has made 
man forever’) with the Wisdom verse, to conclude that the proof of his being 
God is the lasting quality of work in everything he does.38 Also, if the universe 
is one and united and connected in itself, the creator of this must also be one. 
Eusebius is keen to establish monotheism, although he then takes a next step 
to say that the one who acts in time is the Word, who in turn is the one that 
orders humans from the beginning towards the life to come. The verse is also 
employed in the Praeparatio evangelica (VII, 3, 3) to suggest that the material 
world cannot give a form by itself but requires human perception of some 
ulterior structure coming from above.
Cyril of Jerusalem in his Catechetical Lectures 9.2 comments: ‘From the 
greatness and beauty of created things the Creator of these can be seen ana-
logically …’39 It is impossible to see the divine nature with eyes of flesh. Yet 
from the divine works one is able to proceed as far as an appearance of the 
divine power. For it does not say that the creator is seen from creatures, but 
adds: ‘analogically’. For God appears greater to each however great the vision 
from creation a human can attain. And when one is lifted up in the heart by this 
greater vision one gains a better perception concerning God.40 Here the accent 
is on the method of knowing, which is ‘the contemplative way’. Gilbert com-
ments that Cyril takes ‘analogically’ in his lemma here in the ‘Romans 12:2 
sense’, that is, knowledge will be given proportionately to different degrees of 
faith.41 The talk of ‘proportionality’ has nothing to do with knowledge of divine 
proportions.
37 Commentary on Isaiah 40:12-4 (‘measured the waters in the hollow of his hand’); GCS 
Eusebius IX, 254. 
38 GCS Eusebius IX, 284:»stßtw kalesátw kaì ânaggeilátw kaì ëtoimasátw moi âfˆoœ 
êpoíjsa ãnqrwpon eîv tòn aî¬na». 
39 CTP 103, 169 (PG 33, 640). 
40 Ibid.: qeían toínun fúsin îde⁄n sarkòv ∫mmasin âdúnaton. êk dè twn ∂rgwn t¬n qeíwn 
eîv fantasían t±v dunámewv êlqe⁄n dunatón….Oû gàr e˝pen, ∫ti êk t¬n ktismátwn ô 
genesiourgóv aût¬n qewre⁄tai. âllà proséqjken, ºti ânalógwv. Tosoútw, gàr meíhwn 
êkástwç faínetai Qeóv, ºsw, ån meíhonov qewríav t¬n ktismátwn êpilábjtai ö ãnqrwpov. 
Kaì ºtan dià t±v meíhonov qewríav ücwq±Ç, t±Ç kardíaç meíhona kaì perì QeoÕ lambánei 
fantasían (the underlined is missing in Codd. Coisl., Coln. Grodecii ‘et omnibus editionibus 
ante Oxoniensem.’ 
41 M. Gilbert, La Critique (1973), 29142: ‘On trouvera une autre interpretation, plutôt curieuse, 
chez Cyrille de Jérusalem, (PG 33 640B = CatLect9.2), où la capacité de contemplation est dite 
proportionnelle à chaque personne humaine, l’une contemplant plus et mieux que l’autre.’ 
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To take two of the four instances where John Chrysostom cites Wisdom 13:5, 
the first is a sermon on the Devil as Tempter: 
For this is as if to say that Wisdom leads us by the hand to the knowledge of God. For it 
enables knowledge of the Master. Shall we say that if we see something beautiful and 
wonderful and this becomes a reason for idolatry for many we then are to blame it? 
By no means, for they were not availing themselves of the necessary remedy. For how 
can it be a cause of idolatry when it leads us by the hand to the knowledge of God?42 
He then adds Rom. 1:20. Then again, in On the Statues he quotes the verse and adds: 
Do you see the greatness? The amazing power of the Maker? Do you see the beauty? 
Be amazed at the Wisdom of the one who gave order.43 
Chrysostom then follows with a quotation from Psalm 18 (19): ‘the heavens 
declare the glory of God’.44
Hilary seems to sound an almost autobiographical note: 
Although my soul was filled with joy, therefore, at the contemplation of this excellent 
and ineffable knowledge, because it worshipped this infinity of a boundless eternity in 
this Father and Creator, still, by a more intensive study it sought for that form itself of 
its infinite and eternal Lord, so that it believed that the immeasurable immensity was 
clothed in some of the splendor of beautiful Wisdom. While the religious mind was 
held captive by the error of its own weakness, the words of the prophet impart to it this 
method for apprehending the knowledge of God’s supreme beauty: For by the greatness 
of the work and the beauty of the creatures the creator of the generations is reasonably 
known [consequenter…conspicitur]. The creator of the great belongs to the greatest and 
the maker of beautiful things to the most beautiful. And since the work surpasses even 
our comprehension, so the worker must far exceed our comprehension…should not the 
Lord of all this beauty itself be conceived as the most beautiful of all beauty, so that, 
while the form of his eternal adornment eludes the mind’s power of comprehension, the 
ornament (ornatus) is not withdrawn from the mind’s power of comprehension (opin-
ionem…intellegentiae sensus)? And we must acknowledge God as the most beautiful 
of all in this manner, that He is not included within the thoughts that we comprehend, 
nor is He beyond the comprehension of our thoughts. 45
However, in what immediately follows Hilary then quickly adds that this 
knowledge in creation produced both an anxiety about and an expectation of 
42 De diabolo tentatore homiliae 1-3; 2 (PG 49, 260-61): Toútwn gàr ∏kastov ©nízato 
diˆ˜n e˝pen, ºti aÀtj pròv qeognwsían ™m¢v xeiragwge⁄. ºti aÀtj poie⁄ êpiginÉskein tòn 
Despótjn. Tí oŒn, êàn ÷dwmen t®n kal®n taútjn kaì qaumastßn, aût®n genoménjn âse­
beíav aîtían pollo⁄v, aîtiasómeqa aûtßn; Oûdam¬v, âllˆêkeínouv toùv m® xrjsaménouv 
eîv déon t¬ç farmákwç. PoÕ oŒn âsebeíav aîtía aÀtj ™ xeiragwgoÕsa pròv qeognwsían;  
43 De statuis homiliae 1-2 (PG 49, 105-7): E˝dev tò mégeqov; qaúmason t®n dúnamin toÕ 
poißsantov. E˝dev tò kállov; êkplágjqi t®n sofían toÕ kosmßsantov. 
44 Chrysostom quotes the verse in two other places: Expositio in Psalmos (2) (PG 55, 48 and 
144), and In Genesim homiliae (PG 53, 44).  
45 De trinitate 1,7 (FC 25, trans. by S. McKenna [Washington: CUA Press, 1954], 9. 
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continuing to exist, and at that point the gospel steps in to reassure humans of 
the celestial Fatherly care. The beauty of God is not really known in itself, quite 
apart from sin, just the Wisdom-impression of it has the effect that we know 
that God is there, beyond knowing.
Returning to later Greek authors, Didymus has: ‘From the greatness and 
beauty of created things the Creator of these can be seen analogically.’46 Thus 
if one gains an image of God from the world, from the order and arrangement 
of providence, then the hidden side of his face is no longer hidden. The Greek 
philosophers also reasoned this way, deducing an image of God from creatures 
and their beauty.’ Didymus seems much more confident than most concerning 
human ability to know God in creation.
Gregory of Nyssa weaves Wisdom 13:5 together with Ps. 15(16):3 and writes: 
‘For from the greatness and beauty of created things their Creator is known 
by analogy’ … ‘We give names to the divine nature which is beyond all under-
standing. We do not rejoice in the names through speaking them, but in jour-
neying through that which is spoken towards the perception (katanoêsin) of 
the hidden things.’47 He mentions that the Psalmist rejoices inwardly before he 
expresses that joy, and so he, like Gregory himself, was not interested in knowl-
edge of God located within terminology.
Theodoret cites Wisdom 13:5 and follows with: 
The works are not equal to the Author, nor their greatness equal to his own. One sees 
them, one touches them, one feels them and certain flaws are associated with them. 
But nobody touches him, nor sees him. Nothing affects or changes him and he brooks 
no limits as his works do. So it is apt that he added in his text the expression ‘by anal-
ogy’. When we regard the vault of the heavens, the extent of the earth, the vastness of 
the sea, the brilliance of the sun or the light of the moon and all that happens upon our 
vision, we do not equate them with the creator, but we say that he surpasses his works 
by infinite greatness and beauty [Romans 1:20 is then cited]. So it is by the mediation 
of visible things that we can represent the invisible Creator to ourselves […] Thus when 
we lift our eyes on creation, we are charmed by its greatness, its beauty and the benefits 
which flow from it: but the mind leaves all that aside and runs towards the one who 
has ordained it all with Wisdom.
The message is that form is what matters. Although the qualities of creation 
indeed reflect Him and allow humans to represent him, God draws humans 
through the order of creation, as by a higher, spiritual beauty. It seems that one 
of the functions that the association of Wisdom 13:5 with Romans 1:20 has is to 
dissociate Romans 1:20 from Romans 1:21: ‘for although they knew God they 
neither glorified him as God nor thanked him.48
46 On Ps. 30:25 (PTA 8,112), trans. by S. Voicu, ACCS, Apocrypha (Downers Grove: IVP, 2010). 
47 Contra Eunomium II 154 (GNO I, 270). 
48 Therapeutic for Hellenic Maladies, in: Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques III 16-7 




After this rather cursory view of the evidence, now to state a conclusion of a 
general nature. For these Eastern fathers and Hilary, this text from Wisdom 
explodes in a number of directions, scattering a variety of ideas among its read-
ers, linking itself with diverse texts and ideas, scriptural and otherwise. Therein 
lies its authority. It is especially interesting that in Theodoret’s treatment the 
verse rules over Romans 1:20-1, so as to divide them from each other and side-
line the more negative-sounding second of these two verses. It might not be 
surprising that it is only Hilary who wants to affix to this original knowledge 
the notion of anxiety and fall, and that Augustine is quite unsure about this 
knowledge being anything more than very partial. The other (Greek) fathers 
seem happier with the idea that knowledge to be gained from creation is saving 
knowledge, although knowledge might mean something different to each of 
them. As one works from Origen to Theodoret through a number of Church 
fathers, there seems to be a move from ‘power’ to ‘glory’ then to ‘order’ as that 
which plays a kind of mediating role in conveying something of God to human 
knowledge. Wisdom 13:5, and possibly the book as a whole seems to offer 
instruction more in the area of what might be termed ‘Christian philosophy’ 
than doctrinal theology. The knowledge to be gained is ‘practical knowing’, 
sapientia: its teaching concerns the Christian life and its ways of seeking God, 
without as such contributing much to what can be said about Him (‘theology’).
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